FCPA Actions in China and China’s Anti-Bribery Law by Chen, Yu












     
 





I. THE FCPA IN GENERAL.............................................................................73 
A. Anti-Bribery Provisions Under the FCPA .......................................73 
B. Accounting Provisions Under the FCPA .........................................74 
C. FCPA Enforcements in China..........................................................75 
II. OVERVIEW OF THE CHINESE ANTI-BRIBERY LAW FRAMEWORK..................77 
A. Anti-Bribery Law Framework ..........................................................78 
1. Public Sector Bribery................................................................79 
2. Commercial Bribery .................................................................79 
3. Overseas Bribery ......................................................................79 
B. Anti-Bribery Provisions Under the Chinese Criminal Law..............80 
C. Enforcement Agencies for Bribery and Corruption .........................81 
III. ANALYSIS OF FCPA ENFORCEMENTS IN CHINA ..........................................82 
A. Business Culture in China ...............................................................82 
B. Economic System in China...............................................................83 
C. Difference Between China’s Anti-Bribery Laws and 
 the FCPA .........................................................................................84 
1. Foreign Official as an Employee of a SOE Under 
 the FCPA ..................................................................................85 
a. Definition ..........................................................................85 
b. Enforcement Actions with Regards to a 
 Foreign Official ................................................................85 
c. Doctors and Administrators in State-Owned
 Hospitals ...........................................................................88 
2. State Personnel Under Chinese Criminal Law .........................88 
* © 2019 Yu Chen.  Ph.D. candidate, Renmin University of China School of Law,
2014−19. Visiting Scholar, University of Pittsburgh School of Law, 2017−18. 
 71

















    
  
 




    
  
 
   
 
a. Definition ..........................................................................88 
b. State Personnel and Non-State Personnel 
in SOEs .............................................................................89 
c. Doctors and Administrators in State-Owned
 Hospitals ...........................................................................90 
d. GSK Case in China ...........................................................91 
3. “Anything of Value” Under the FCPA .....................................94 
a. Definition ..........................................................................94 
b. Enforcement Actions with Regards to Things 
 of Value.............................................................................94 
4. Money or Property Under Chinese Criminal Law ....................97 
a. Definition ..........................................................................97 
b. “Intangible Benefits” in China .........................................97 
D. The Dilemma of MNCs That Operate Businesses in China..............99 
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS ..................................................................................99 
A. Design Compliance Procedures to Meet Both U.S. and
 Chinese Requirements......................................................................99 
B. Clarify the FCPA’s Definition of “Foreign Official” and 
 “Anything of Value” ......................................................................100 
C. Continue to Improve Chinese Anti-Bribery Law Framework ........101 
1. Amendment of Anti-Bribery Provisions ..................................101 
2. Publish Guidance Concerning the Anti-Corruption  
Provisions in China ................................................................102 
3. Participate in International Cooperation with 
 Foreign Countries...................................................................102 
INTRODUCTION
In recent decades, the United States Department of Justice (DOJ) has
greatly improved its enforcement of the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices 
Act (FCPA).1 Some of these FCPA enforcement cases involve China.2 Given 
1. In 2000, the DOJ did not prosecute any FCPA violations. U.S. DEP’T OF
JUSTICE,FCPA and Related Enforcement Actions: Chronological List, 2000, (last updated June
16, 2015), https://www.justice.gov/criminal-fraud/case/related-enforcement-actions-
chronological-list-2000 [https://perma.cc/X3U4-ERGU]. In 2015, the DOJ prosecuted
fifteen violations. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FCPA and Related Enforcement Actions: 
Chronological List, 2015, (last updated May 30, 2018), https://www.justice.gov/criminal-
fraud/case/related-enforcement-actions/2015 [https://perma.cc/FR9R-5XNL]. In 2016, the
number of prosecutions jumped to thirty-two. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FCPA and Related 
Enforcement Actions: Chronological List, 2016 (last updated May 18, 2018), https://www. 
justice.gov/criminal-fraud/case/related-enforcement-actions/2016 [https://perma.cc/8AYT-ZRU2].
In 2017, the DOJ prosecuted thirty-six violations. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FCPA and Related
Enforcement Actions: Chronological List, 2017 (last updated May 30, 2019), https://www.
justice.gov/criminal-fraud/case/related-enforcement-actions/2017 [https://perma.cc/CS9X-J6YP].
2. See SHEARMAN & STERLING LLP, FCPA Digest: Recent Trends and Patterns in 
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China’s prominence as a center of global business, this trend is likely to
increase in the foreseeable future. 
Section I of this Article briefly reviews the provisions of the FCPA, and
recent FCPA enforcement in China. Section II discusses China’s anti- bribery 
law regime, anti-bribery provisions and agencies enforcing bribery and
corruption. Section III focuses on an analysis of FCPA cases involving China, 
in addition to describing the business culture and the economic system in
China. The differences between China’s anti-bribery laws and the FCPA
explain the existence for a wide array of potential FCPA violations. Section IV 
recommends that China make widespread changes by establishing clear rules, 
publishing anti-bribery practice guides, and by building up international
cooperation with other countries. 
I. THE FCPA IN GENERAL
U.S. Congress enacted the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) in 
19773 after a series of scandals in which hundreds of U.S. companies paid
millions of dollars in bribes to secure business from foreign officials.4 Congress 
amended the FCPA twice: once in 1988 to add affirmative defenses,5 and 
once in 1998 to comply with the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention’s 
requirement to include bribery of foreign nationals.6 Generally, the FCPA 
consists of anti-bribery provisions which prohibit offering bribes and
accounting provisions.7 
A. Anti-Bribery Provisions Under the FCPA 
The FCPA anti-bribery provisions prohibit offer, payment, promise to 
pay, or authorization of payment of anything of value to any foreign official, 
foreign political party, official, or candidate, in order to obtain or retain
3. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95−213, 91 Stat. 1494
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1, 78dd-2, 78dd-3, 78ff, 78m(b), (d)(1), (g)-(h) 
(LexisNexis 2006 & Supp. 2010)). 
4. CRIMINAL DIV. OF DEP’T OF JUSTICE & ENF’T DIV. OF SEC. AND EXCH. COMM’N, 
A Resource Guide to the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act 2−3 (Nov. 14, 2012)
[hereinafter FCPA Resource Guide], https://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/resources/29520121 
114101438198031.pdf [https://perma.cc/HP4K-PJUJ].
5. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Amendments of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100−418,
§§ 5001−5003, 102 Stat. 1415, 1424. 
6. Int’l Anti-Bribery and Fair Competition Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-366,
§§ 1−6, 112 Stat. 3302. 
7. See generally Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977 and 1988 Amendments. 
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 their employees, U.S. persons
and businesses (“domestic concerns”),
business.8 These provisions apply to issuers,9
10 and certain foreign persons or
businesses.11 Whenever issuers or domestic concerns use interstate commerce 
to make a payment to foreign officials, their conduct is governed by the FCPA, 
regardless of whether it occurs within the United States or abroad.12 
Entities other than issuers or domestic concerns that directly or indirectly 
engage in any act in furtherance of a corrupt payment while in the United
States are also covered by the FCPA.13 
Under the FCPA, it is unlawful to:
1. make use of interstate commerce,
2. corruptly,
3. in furtherance of an offer of anything of value, 
4. to (a) a foreign official, (b) a foreign political party, party
official, or candidate for office or (c) to any person while 
knowing that all or any portion of such thing of value will be 
offered or given to a foreign official, political party or candidate, 
5. for the purpose of inducing a foreign official to use his 
influence to affect any act or decision of his government or 
governmental instrumentality, or to secure any improper 
advantage,
6. in order to obtain or retain business, or direct business to any 
person.14 
B. Accounting Provisions Under the FCPA 
FCPA accounting provisions require companies to make annual reports, 
keep accurate records of their transactions, and create internal accounting 
controls.15 These provisions apply to issuers, domestic and foreign companies
listed on any U.S. stock exchange, or those required to file reports with
8.  15 U.S.C. § 78dd-3(a). 
9. § 78dd-1(a) (defining this group as including domestic and foreign companies 
listed on any U.S. stock exchange or which are required to file reports with the U.S. Securities 
and Exchange Commission). 
10. § 78dd-2(h)(l) (including any individual who is a U.S. citizen, national, or resident
and any corporation, partnership, association, joint-stock company, business trust, unincorporated 
organization, or sole proprietorship, which has its principal place of business in the United 
States, or which is organized under U.S. laws). 
11.  § 78dd-3(f )(1). 
12.  § 78dd-2(h)(5). 
13.  § 78dd-3(a). 
14. RONALD A. BRAND, FUNDAMENTALS OF INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS
907−08 (Kluwer L. Int’l., 2000) (citing 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1(a), (2)(a)). 
15.  § 78m(a), (b) (2006). 
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the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC).16 The accounting 
provisions ensure that all public companies account for all of their assets 
and liabilities accurately and in reasonable detail.17 
The FCPA books and records provision requires all issuers to “make 
and keep books, records, and accounts, which in reasonable detail, accurately 
and fairly reflect the transactions and dispositions of the assets of the 
issuer.”18 The reasonable detail standard is one that would “satisfy prudent
officials in the conduct of their own affairs” and it balances numerous 
relevant factors, including the cost of compliance.19 
The record-keeping and internal controls provision also ensures that a
company properly uses its assets, encourages accurate recording of improper 
payments, and prevents the mischaracterization of transactions.20 The 
internal controls provision requires issuers to create internal controls that 
reasonably ensure the accurate execution and recording of transactions.21 
Companies have the discretion to develop their own controls to meet their 
particular needs and circumstances, but they must take into consideration 
the realities and risks associated with their respective businesses.22 
C. FCPA Enforcements in China
Recent FCPA enforcement efforts have focused on multinational companies 
(MNCs) that conduct businesses in China. In 2010, the SEC filed a complaint 
against RAE Systems Inc. alleging that two joint venture entities in China 
violated the FCPA by furnishing luxury gifts such as jade jewelry, fur coats, 
and high priced liquor to government officials in order to obtain or retain 
business.23 In December 2014, Avon paid $135 million to resolve FCPA 
charges alleging that its China subsidiary made $8 million worth of payments 
in cash, gifts, travel, and entertainment to various Chinese officials in exchange 
16. See § 78m (the provision applies to “[e]very issuer which has a class of securities 
registered pursuant to section 781 of this title and every issuer which is required to file reports 
pursuant to section 78o(d)”). 
17. FCPA Resource Guide, supra note 4, at 38. 
18. § 78m(b)(2)(A).
19. FCPA Resource Guide, supra note 4, at 39. 
20. Id. at 40. 
21. § 78m(b)(2)(B).
22. FCPA Resource Guide, supra note 4, at 40. 














     
 
      
  
 
      
  
 
    
   
   
 




   
 
  
for obtaining direct selling licenses in China.24 In July 2015, Mead 
Johnson paid $12 million to settle FCPA-related charges alleging that its China 
unit paid $2 million in bribes to healthcare professionals at state-owned 
hospitals.25 
In the battle against corruption and bribery, 2016 was defined in large
part by one country and one industry: China and healthcare/life sciences. 
Of the twenty-seven enforcement actions in 2016—corporate and individual 
combined—thirteen involved alleged acts of bribery in China.26 While 
SEC and FCPA enforcements have prominently targeted China in past 
years, 2016 is unique because no other country has been the target of such 
a significant portion of FCPA enforcement actions. As of 2017, China had 
experienced the greatest number of FCPA enforcement actions—89 from 
1978 to 2017.27 In 2018, five corporate FCPA enforcement actions resulted 
in more than $162.2 million in penalties paid to the DOJ and to the SEC to 
resolve FCPA offenses in China.28 “[A]mong the anti-corruption developments 
in Asia, ‘China presently stands out as the most important and active 
jurisdiction,’” given the high amount of FCPA-related activities in China.29 
In 2017, China ranked 77th of 180 countries and territories in the
Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index—scoring 41 
points.30 The average score in the Asia Pacific region was 44.31 The index 
24. Press Release, U.S. Sec. and Exch. Comm’n, SEC Charges Avon with FCPA
Violations (Dec. 17, 2014) (on file with author), https://www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/ 
2014-285.html [https://perma.cc/2WRY-XCRE].
25. Press Release, U.S. Sec. and Exch. Comm’n, SEC Charges Mead Johnson Nutrition
with FCPA Violations (Jul. 28, 2015) (on file with author), https://www.sec.gov/news/
pressrelease/2015-154.html [https://perma.cc/52X5-NECC].
26. See U.S. SEC. AND EXCH. COMM’N ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS: FCPA CASES (2019),
https://www.sec.gov/spotlight/fcpa/fcpa-cases.shtml [https://perma.cc/8J3C-JBLQ] (listing 
SEC enforcement actions since 2010, and listing actions against General Cable Corporation,
GlaxoSmithKline, Nu Skin Enterprises, Jun Ping Zhang, AstraZeneca, Johnson Controls, 
Akamai Technologies, Nortek, Las Vegas Sands, Novartis AG, Qualcomm, PTC, SciClone
Pharmaceuticals involving China or Chinese officials).
27. Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP, 2017 Year-End FCPA Update 5 (Jan. 2, 2018), 
https://www.gibsondunn.com/2017-year-end-fcpa-update/ [https://perma.cc/5CQD-G2TB].
28. See Richard L. Cassin, 2018 FCPA Enforcement Index, THE FCPA BLOG (Jan. 
2, 2019, 7:28 AM), http://www.fcpablog.com/blog//2019/1/2/2018-fcpa-enforcement-index. 
html [https://perma.cc/69DJ-LE3M].
 29. Yin Wilczek, Anti-Bribery Trends in 2015 to Include Continuing SEC Aggressiveness, 
Panelists Say, BLOOMBERG BNA (Jan. 15, 2015), http://www.bna.com/2015-antibribery-
trends-n17179922157 [https://perma.cc/7VAF-VLAB].
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uses “a scale of 0 to 100, where 100 means very clean and 0 reflects a deep- 
rooted, systemic corruption problem . . . .”32 
II. OVERVIEW OF THE CHINESE ANTI-BRIBERY LAW FRAMEWORK
China enacted its modern criminal law in 197933after the end of the Cultural 
Revolution.34 It has since been amended nine times.35 China ratified the
United Nations Convention against Corruption (UNCAC) in 200636 in an
aggressive step to manage its overwhelming problem with corruption. In 
2011, the National People’s Congress of China amended China’s criminal 
laws to prohibit bribery of foreign officials and now bribery is codified 
under eight articles in Section 837 of the Criminal Law of the People’s Republic
of China. China’s Anti-Unfair Competition Law (AUCL) also imposes 
administrative penalties on unfair competition, including commercial bribery.38 
The bribery provisions and the AUCL constitute the anti-bribery laws of China. 
This section discusses the framework of the anti-bribery laws in detail.
32. Id. 
33. See generally U.S Congressional-Executive Commission on China, Criminal 
Law of the People’s Republic of China, https://www.cecc.gov/resources/legal-provisions/
criminal-law-of-the-peoples-republic-of-china [https://perma.cc/KQ9F-PWD6] (last visited 
Nov. 8, 2019) (providing an official translation of the law into English). 
34. See Cultural Revolution, WIKIPEDIA https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cultural_
Revolution [https://perma.cc/C58V-VHLE].
35. Id. 
36. United Nations Office on Drugs and Crimes, Signature and Ratification, https://
www.unodc.org/unodc/en/corruption/ratification-status.html [https://perma.cc/8L9V-83C5]
(last visited Nov. 8, 2019). 
37. Zhonghua Renmin GongheguoXingfa (中华人民共和国刑法 ) [Criminal Law
of the People’s Republic of China] (promulgated by the President of the People’s Republic 
of China, July 1, 1979, amended Mar. 14, 1997, effective Oct. 1, 1997, amended Dec. 25, 1999, 
amended Aug. 31, 2001, amended Dec. 29, 2001, amended Dec. 28, 2002, amended Feb. 28, 
2005, amended June 29, 2006, amended Feb. 28, 2009, amended Feb. 25, 2011, effective 
May 1, 2011), arts. 163–64, 385, 387, 389, 391–93 [hereinafter Chinese criminal law]. The 
U.S Congressional-Executive Commission on China’s website provides an official translation
of the law and of its amendments, see supra note 33. 
38. See generally PRC Anti-Unfair Competition Law [Anti-Unfair Competition Law of
the People’s Republic of China] (revised and adopted by Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s 
Cong., Nov. 4, 2017, effective Jan. 1, 2018) 2017 STANDING COMM. NAT’L PEOPLE’S CONG. 
GAZ., [hereinafter AUCL]. 
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A. Anti-Bribery Law Framework 
In China, there are two sets of laws related to bribery: one set of laws 
involves the bribery of state officials,39 and the other applies to commercial 
bribery, i.e. between private individuals.40 Specifically, Article 395 of Chinese 
criminal law criminalizes bribery of state officials and if known as public 
sector bribery,41 while Article 163 of Chinese criminal law42 and Article 7 of
the AUCL43 regulate commercial bribery. In response to increasing corruption 
in the early 21st century, the Supreme People’s Court (SPC)44 and the
Supreme People’s Procuratorate (SPP)45 jointly issued the following opinions 
to provide further guidance on adjudicating criminal bribery cases: “Several 
Issues Concerning the Application of Law in the Handling of Criminal Case 
of Graft and Briberies,”46 “Interpretation of Several Issues Concerning the
Specific Application of Law in Handling Criminal Cases of Bribery,47 and 
39.  See infra note 41. 
40.  See infra notes 42, 43. 
41. Chinese criminal law, art. 389 (An act of giving state personnel article of property
in order to seek illegitimate gain shall be considered a crime of offering bribes. In economic
activities, whoever gives articles of property to state personnel in violation of state provisions,
when the amount is fairly large, or gives a kickback or service charges of various types to 
state personnel in violation of state provisions is to be dealt with as committing the crime 
of offering bribes.). 
42. Chinese criminal law, art. 163 (Where any of the employees of any company or 
enterprise or any other entity exerts any property by taking advantage of his position or 
accepts any money or property of any other person so as to seek any benefits for such person, 
and if the amount is considerably large, he shall be sentenced to fixed-term imprisonment 
of not more than five years or detention. If the amount is huge, he shall be sentenced to 
fixed-term imprisonment of less than five years, and his properties may be confiscated.). 
43. AUCL, art. 7 (A business shall not seek transaction opportunities or competitive 
edges by bribing the following entities or individuals with property or by any other means: 
(1) An employee of the other party to a transaction; (2) The entity or individual authorized 
by the other party to a transaction to handle relevant affairs; (3) An entity or an individual 
that uses power or influence to affect a transaction.).
44.  The Supreme People’s Court is the highest judicial court in China. 
45. The Supreme People’s Procuratorate is the highest agency in China that exercises
and supervises prosecutorial authority at all state and local levels. 
46. Interpretation of the Supreme People’s Court and the Supreme People’s 
Procuratorate on Several Issues Concerning the Application of Law in the Handling of 
Criminal Cases of Graft and Bribery, COVINGTON & BURLING LLP, https://www.cov. 
com/-/media/files/corporate/publications/2016/04/judicial_interpretation_on_bribery_2016_04_ 
cn_en.pdf (last visited Nov. 8, 2019) [https://perma.cc/3M9U-5ZS9]. 
47. Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Zuigao Renmin Jianchayuan Guanyu Banli Hang Hui
XingshiAnjianJutiYingyongFaluRuoganWenti de Jieshi(最高人民法院最高人民检察院
关于办理行贿刑事案件具体应用法律若干问题的解释) [The Interpretation of the Sup. 
People’s Ct. and the Sup. People’s Proc. of Several Issues Concerning the Specific Application 
of the Law in the Handling of Criminal Bribery Cases] (promulgated by the Sup. People’s 
Ct. and the Sup. People’s Proc., Dec. 26, 2012, effective Jan. 1, 2013), translated in 
Interpretation of Several Issues Concerning the Specific Application of Law in Handling 
Criminal Cases of Bribery, THE SUPREME PEOPLE’S PROCURATORATE OF THE PEOPLE’S 
78
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“Interpretation of Several Issues Concerning the Application of Laws in
Handling Criminal Cases of Corruption and Bribery.”48 
1. Public Sector Bribery 
Public sector bribery exists when the recipient of a bribe is serving, or
was serving, as a state personnel or has a close connection to someone 
who is, or was, serving as state personnel (it thus relates to both current 
and former employees).49 The list of acts constituting public sector bribery
offenses is broader than that of commercial bribery.50 The penalties are
also more serious, including the death penalty for officials who accept a 
bribe in the most serious cases.51 
2. Commercial Bribery 
Commercial bribery exists when private parties give or receive bribes
for business purposes, and where non-state personnel, for instance those 
who work in state-owned entities (SOEs), are involved.52 Giving or receiving
a commercial bribe is illegal, but acting as an intermediary in commercial 
bribery is not; yet, actions that cannot be criminally prosecuted may still 
incur administrative liability within the AUCL.53 
3. Overseas Bribery
Overseas bribery includes bribing foreign officials or international 
public organizations’ officials.54 Chinese companies or individuals break 
REPUBLIC OF CHINA (last visited Aug. 31, 2019), http://www.spp.gov.cn [https://perma.cc/ 
B52H-6QKM]; Interpretation of Several Issues Concerning the Application of Law in Handling
Corruption and Bribery Criminal Cases, THE SUPREME PEOPLE’S PROCURATORATE OF THE 
PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA (last visited Aug. 31, 2019), https://www.spp.gov.cn.
48. Id.
49. Chinese criminal law, art. 390A (prohibiting bribing former state personnel (including
retried employees) or close connection (that is, a family member or other close connection) 
of serving or former state personnel). 
50. Compare Chinese criminal law, art.163 (commercial bribery), with Chinese criminal
law, art. 395 (public sector bribery). 
51. Id. art. 383. 
52.  See infra Section III.C.
53.  See generally AUCL, supra note 38. 
54. Chinese criminal law, art. 164 (Whoever gives any property to a personnel of a 
foreign country or an official of an international public organization for any improper commercial 
benefit shall be punished according to the provision of the preceding paragraph.). 
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the law when giving an overseas bribe seeking or intending to gain improper 
commercial benefits, the punishment for commercial and overseas bribery 
is the same and only applies to the party that provides the bribe.55 
B. Anti-Bribery Provisions Under the Chinese Criminal Law 
These anti-bribery provisions prohibit state personnel,56 SOEs, non-
state entities, and employees from taking advantage of their positions to 
demand bribes or to accept bribes to secure benefits for the briber.57 The
provisions also prohibit individuals from receiving illegitimate benefits
by giving bribes to state personnel, SOEs, nonstate entities, and employees 
or from receiving improper commercial benefits through bribes to foreign 
personnel or international public organizations officials.58 Furthermore,
individuals may not give or accept rebates or service charges while 
conducting economic activities.59 
Criminal penalties for parties accepting bribes—the demand side—are
generally harsher than penalties for parties giving bribes—the supply side 
—within Chinese criminal law.60  Individuals who accept bribes may be
sanctioned with fines, criminal detention, fixed-term imprisonment, confiscation 
of property, and—in the most serious circumstances—the death penalty.61 
SOEs and companies convicted of bribery are subject to fines, and the
employees who are directly responsible for the crime are subject to fixed-
term imprisonment or criminal detention.62 The SPC and SPP have clarified 
and expanded upon bribery enforcement, focusing on the penalties for bribe-
givers.63 
Currently, there are no accounting provision in Chinese criminal law 
similar to those under the FCPA.64 Criminal charges are the principal means
55. Id.
56. Id. art. 93 (Personnel engaged in public service in state-owned corporations, enterprises,
institutions, and people’s organizations; and personnel which state organs, state-owned 
corporations, enterprises, and institutions assign to engage in public service in non-state owned 
corporations, enterprises, institutions, and social organizations; as well as other working 
personnel engaged in public service according to the law, are to be treated as state personnel.). 
57. Id. arts. 163, 385−88; AUCL, supra note 38, art. 7. 
58.  Chinese criminal law, arts. 163−64, 389−93; AUCL, supra note 38, art. 8. 
59. Chinese criminal law, arts. 163, 387, 389, 391, 393; AUCL, supra note 38, art. 8.
60.  Chinese criminal law, arts. 163, 387, 389, 391, 393. 
61. Id. arts. 163−64, 382−383, 386. 
62. Id. art. 387. 
63. The Supreme People’s Procuratorate of the People’s Republic of China’s Interpretations,
supra note 47. 
64. Id.
80
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of enforcing anticorruption laws.65 Moreover, China heavily focuses on 
the demand side while it ignores the supply side of bribery.66 
C. Enforcement Agencies for Bribery and Corruption 
On March 20, 2018, the National People’s Congress (NPC) of China 
adopted the People’s Republic of China (PRC) Supervision Law (SL).67 
The SL established a new state supervisory committee (SSC) at each
administrative level, which oversees public officials.68 The SL merged the
powers of the central commission for discipline inspection (CCDI) of the 
Chinese Communist Party, the Ministry of Supervision, the National Bureau 
of Corruption Prevention (NBCP) and the Ministry of Public Security to 
investigate officials’ corruption.69 SSC became the most efficient investigation 
agency in China against corruption of Chinese public officials.70 
Public officials are broadly defined under the SL and include government
officials, managers of SOEs, and personnel engaged in management of public 
entities.71 Practically speaking, this means that the anti-corruption campaign,72 
which up to now focused on members of the Communist Party, will be 
expanded to include all civil servants and state-owned enterprises.73 One
of the major functions of the SSC is to conduct anti-corruption work, including 
supervision, investigation, and disposition,74 providing suggestions for future 
supervision, or transferring investigation results to the procuratorate to 
review or prosecute.75 
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Zhonghua Ren Min GongheguoJiancha Fa (中华⼈民共和国监察法) [Supervision
Law of the People’s Republic of China] (promulgated by National People’s Cong., Mar. 
20, 2018, effective Mar. 30, 2018), art. 5. 
68. Id. 
69. Id. art. 15 (describing the relevant personnel and functions encompassed within
the scope and jurisdiction of the supervision law); Jamie P. Horsley, What’s so controversial 
about China’s new anti-corruption body?, BROOKINGS (May 30, 2018), https://www.brookings.edu/
opinions/whats-so-controversial-about-chinas-new-anti-corruption-body/ [https://perma.cc/
YA7D-RAE9].
70. Horsley, supra note 69. 
71. Supervision Law, supra note 67, art. 12. 
72.  Since China’s current president, Xi Jinping, launched his anti-corruption campaign 
in late 2012, the country has seen unprecedented targeting of government officials. 
73. Supervision Law, supra note 67, art. 12. 
74. Id. art. 15. 
75. Id. art. 18. 
 81















   
  
   
 
      
Until the adoption of the SL, several Chinese government agencies were
responsible for enforcing compliance with China’s bribery and corruption 
laws, including the Supreme People’s Procuratorate (SPP)76 and its local 
counterparts, referred to as the Local People’s Procuratorate; the Supreme 
People’s Court (SPC)77 and its local counterparts, referred to as the Local 
People’s Court; the State Supervisory Committee (SSC) and its local 
counterparts, referred to as the Local SSCs; and the State Administration 
for Industry and Commerce (SAIC)78 and its local counterparts, referred
to as the local AIC.79 
III. ANALYSIS OF FCPA ENFORCEMENTS IN CHINA
China’s rise as a global economic power means that more DOJ and SEC
enforcement actions will likely involve MNCs doing business in China. 
The rise in China-related FCPA enforcement actions in 2016 appears to be due to 
(i) China’s size (both as a matter of geography and population); (ii) China’s role 
in the global economy; (iii) the similarity between bribery schemes arising out of 
China (i.e. gifts, travel, and entertainment); and (iv) the fact that many China-
related bribery schemes involved the same industry (i.e. the healthcare and life 
science sectors).80 
Meanwhile, several other factors coalesce to make China an environment in
which FCPA violations are likely to occur on a frequent basis. 
A. Business Culture in China 
The nature and development of business culture in China is deeply
rooted in its unequal historical tradition and relates back to the Confucian 
concept of social hierarchy.81 Confucianism defines individuals by their 
76. See supra Section II.A. 
77. Id.
78. Id. The SAIC is a central government ministry directly under the State Council. 
It is responsible for market supervision and regulation, and related law enforcement through 
administrative means (in particular it enforces the AUCL). The SAIC regulates the areas 
of business registration, competition, consumer protection, trademark protection and economic 
crimes. It also co-ordinates the local AICs at or below the provincial level. 
79.  Cf. id.
80. FCPA Digest Cases and Review Release Relating to Bribes to Foreign Officials 




81. For more background information, see generally Patricia Pattison & Daniel Herron,
The Mountains Are High and the Emperor is Far Away: Sanctity of Contract in China, 40 
AM. BUS. L.J. 459, 460, 477−79 (2003). 
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families and social networks.82 The definition—or more precisely, structure
—of family in China is much broader than that observed in the West.83 
Businesses in traditional Chinese culture, consequently, did not operate 
independently of family and social relationships.84 In fact, familial relationships
take precedence over contractual ones.85 The emphasis on special relationships, 
particularly in the business context, can ultimately lead to bribery and 
corruption as businesses and government officials seek to exploit their 
networks to gain private advantages.86 These practices, which date back 
hundreds of years, are so ingrained that they will be difficult to change 
without a strong political will on the part of the Chinese government and 
changes in popular attitudes among the Chinese business community. 
Thus, Confucianism is wholly inconsistent with the goals of the FCPA. 
B. Economic System in China
Since China’s economic reforms began in 1978, the role of state-owned
entities (SOEs) in the economy has decreased: in 2015, the share of SOEs 
in comparison to the total GDP declined to less than 30%, while the share
of non-state owned organizations increased to about 70% of the total GDP.87 
In contrast to the declining dominance of SOEs, the non-state sector became
significantly more dynamic and is now the main source of employment
and innovation: it accounted for approximately 78% of total employment
and over 70% of expenditures in research and development in 2015.88 
Nevertheless, many important sectors of the economy continue to be controlled 
by SOEs, including banking, oil, and gas production and exploration, steel 
82. Piero Tozzii, Note Constitutional Reform on Taiwan: Fulfilling a Chinese Notion of
Democratic Sovereignty?, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 1193, 1199 (1995). 
83. See id. (“Confucianism is concerned with the moral cultivation of the individual, 
who exists not as a solitary creature, but as family member, friend, and subject . . . Undergirding 
all society is the family.”). 
84.  Cf. id. at 1200. 
85.  See id.
86. See, e.g., Miceala Tucker, “Guanxi!” - “Gesundheit!” An Alternative View on the “Rule
of Law” Panacea in China, 35 VT. L. REV. 689, 690, 696, 700 (2011). 
87. See National Bureau of Statistic of China, China Statistical Yearbook 2016, 
Index 1–8 (2016), http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjsj/ndsj/2016/indexeh.htm [https://perma.cc/ 
MN9Y-4MTL].
88.  See, e.g., id. at Index 4-1 and 20-1. 
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production, telecommunications, electricity and water supply, and transport.89 
Most hospitals in China are also operated by the state.90 
SOEs are utilized and managed at the central, provincial, and local 
levels—the latter two usually face increasing competition in the domestic 
market. In fact, the number of central SOEs, that is, those managed by the 
State-Owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC),91 
steadily decreased from 152 in 20076 to 102 in 2016,92 and to 96 at the end of
2017.93 
Chinese SOEs often behave as independent entities. Over the years, 
SOEs began to compete against each others, even in sectors where centralized
SOEs have enjoyed relative dominance, such as petroleum extraction,
telecommunications, and financial sectors. As a consequence, these firms
also face increasing competition in the domestic market from both domestic
and foreign-invested private firms.
Though certainly not complete, and not without periodic setbacks and 
retrenchments, SOEs overall have shifted toward both a greater commercial 
orientation based on market forces and the adoption of professional 
management systems and standards more akin to internationally accepted 
practices. However, on balance, SOEs do remain instruments of national 
policy, and this dual role as government entities and profit-seeking firms 
can create ongoing confusion and tensions, both domestically and abroad.94 
The next sections will illustrate these tensions and inconsistencies.
C. Difference Between China’s Anti-Bribery Laws and the FCPA95 
Many differences exist between China’s domestic laws against commercial 
bribery and the FCPA, and a transaction that violates the FCPA under the 
89. See, e.g., id. at Index 13-2. 
90. Id. It impacts the classification of employees (state v. non-state personnel) for
the purposes of interpreting anti-bribery provisions: see infra Section III.C.2.c. 
91. SASAC perform the investor’s responsibilities supervises and manages the
state-owned assets of the enterprises under the supervision of the Central Government, 
enhances management of the state-owned assets. See SASAC (explaining the SASAC’s 
role in China), http://en.sasac.gov.cn/2018/07/17/c_7.htm [perma.cc/5PBS-SRE8]. 
92. Zhiting Chen, Governing Through the Market: SASAC and the Resurgence of
Central State-Owned Enterprises in China, 166–67 (Sept. 2017) (unpublished Ph.D. thesis, 
University of Birmingham) (on file with the University of Birmingham). 
93. See SASAC, Central Enterprise Directory, http://www.sasac.gov.cn/n2588035/ 
n2641579/n2641645/index.html [perma.cc/75GS-9S9G].
94. China Institute, University of Alberta, State-Owned Enterprises in the Chinese 
Economy Today: Role, Reform and Evolution, 1, 18 (2018), https://cloudfront.ualberta.ca/-
/media/china/media-gallery/research/policy-papers/soepaper1-2018.pdf [https://perma.cc/
9CBV-EAQ6]. 
95. This Article focuses on the issues within the scope of Chinese criminal law and
does not discuss accounting provisions within China’s company law and securities law. 
84
CHEN.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 2/12/2020 3:28 PM      
 




















[VOL. 21:  71, 2019] FCPA Actions in China 
SAN DIEGO INT’L L.J.
aggressive interpretations of DOJ could constitute only a violation of China’s
AUCL,96 even if the transactions does not amount to a crime.97 This section
analyzes two problematic areas under the FCPA: (1) the broad definition 
of a “foreign official” and (2) the proscription of giving “anything of value.” 
1. Foreign Official as an Employee of a SOE Under the FCPA 
a. Definition 
Who constitutes a “foreign official” has long been debated, particularly
whether employees of state-owned entities qualify as such. The FCPA 
designates a “foreign official” as “any officer or employee of a foreign 
government or any department, agency, or instrumentality thereof.”98 The 
DOJ has stated that because SOEs or state-controlled enterprises are 
instrumentalities of the state, any employee of such an enterprise qualifies 
as a “foreign official” under the FCPA.99 The FCPA Resource Guide 
promulgated by the DOJ states that the term “instrumentality” is broad and can 
include state-owned or state-controlled entities.100 Whether a particular entity
constitutes an “instrumentality” under the FCPA requires a fact-specific analysis 
of the entity’s ownership, control, status, and function.101 The generic
concept of “instrumentality” remains undefined.102 For the first forty years
after the FCPA was enacted, not a single court of appeals was tasked with 
clarifying the meaning of this elusive, yet fundamental, term.103 
b. Enforcement Actions with Regards to a Foreign Official 
As of today, only a few defendants have challenged whether a state-
owned corporation can qualify as an instrumentality of a foreign government 
and each time, the court agreed with the DOJ’s interpretation that it can 
qualify as such. 
96. See supra Section II.A.2. Commercial Bribery. 
97.  China Institute, University of Alberta, supra note 94. 
98.  15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(f)(1)(A). 
99. Mike Koehler, The Facade of FCPA Enforcement, 41 GEO. J. INT’L L. 907, 916
(2010).
100. FCPA Resource Guide, supra note 4, at 20. 
101. Id.
102.  Esquenazi v. United States, 752 F.3d 912 (11th Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 135 S. 
Ct. 293 (Oct. 6, 2014) (No. 14-189), 2014 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 2855 at 11. 
103.  See id.
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 In United States v. Carson, 2011 WL 5101701, No. 09-cr-77 (C.D. Cal. May
18, 2011),104 the DOJ charged various defendants with making bribes to employees
of a number of state-owned companies in China and other countries, including 
the China National Offshore Oil Corporation, China Petroleum Materials and 
Equipment, Dongfang Electric Corporation, Guohua Electric Power, Jiangsu Nuclear 
Power Corporation, and PetroChina. The defendants moved to dismiss the indictment 
on the ground that a state-owned corporation, as opposed to a government bureau 
or agency, cannot be an instrumentality of the state and therefore employees of such 
corporations cannot be foreign officials. In Carson, the federal district court, like 
the other courts that have considered this issue, denied a motion to dismiss. 
The court held that some state-owned companies and business entities may be 
“instrumentalities” of the foreign government within the meaning of the FCPA. 
The court held that whether a company qualifies as an instrumentality is a question of 
fact. Government ownership of a company alone does not automatically make the 
company an instrumentality of the government, and other factors must also be 
considered. The court sets forth the following factors: 
1. The foreign state’s characterization of the entity and its employees;
2. The foreign state’s degree of control over the entity; 
3. The purpose of the entity’s activities;
4. The entity’s obligations and privileges under the foreign state’s
law, including whether the entity exercises exclusive or controlling 
power to administer its designated functions; 
5. The circumstances surrounding the entity’s creation; and
6. The foreign state’s extent of ownership of the entity, including the 
level of financial support by the state (e.g., subsidies, special tax 
treatment, and loans). 
The court noted that these factors were not exclusive and that none of them was
dispositive. State ownership was merely one consideration in deciding whether a 
state-owned company constituted an “instrumentality.” The court denied
the defendants’ motion to dismiss on the grounds that the determination of whether 
the Chinese companies were instrumentalities of the state had to be made at trial.105 
In another case, United States v. Esquenazi, 752 F.3d 912 (11th Cir. 2014), 
the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit set forth the meaning of 
“instrumentality” under the FCPA in a test determining when the executives 
and employees of a government-owned or a government-controlled company
can be considered foreign officials.106 The defendants in Esquenazi were
co-owners of Terra Telecommunications Corporation, an American corporation, 
which purchased phone time from Telecommunications D’Haiti, S.A.M 
(Tele Co), the monopoly phone company in Haiti, to resell to customers 
in the United States.107 The defendants arranged to make “side payments”
to Tele Co executives to reduce debts that Terra Telecommunications 
104. See United States v. Carson, 2011 WL 5101701, No. 09-cr-77 (C.D. Cal. May 18, 
2011).
105. Daniel Chow, China Under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 573 WIS. L.
REV. 573, 578−79 (2012). 
106.  Esquenazi, 752 F.3d at 925. 
107. Id. at 917. 
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Corporation owed to Tele Co.108 The United States alleged that Tele Co 
was an instrumentality of the Haitian government, and therefore its executives 
were considered “foreign officials” under the FCPA definition.109 The
Esquenazi court determined that whether a SOE can be considered an 
instrumentality of a foreign government must be answered on a case-by-
case basis, and it developed control and function tests intended to be “helpful”
but “non-exhaustive” guidelines for determining such.110 The two-prong
control and function inquiry asked whether the entity was controlled by a 
foreign government and whether the entity performed a function the controlling 
government treats as its own.111 
Under the first prong, the court articulated that control is evaluated by
considering: (1) whether the entity has been formally designated as government 
controlled; (2) whether the government has a majority ownership stake in 
the entity; (3) whether the government has the ability to select management; 
(4) whether the government retains profits and covers shortfalls.112 
To determine whether a state-owned entity performs a function the 
controlling government treats as its own under the second prong, the court 
set forth various factors, including whether: (1) the entity has a monopoly;
(2) the government subsidizes the entity’s operations; (3) services are provided 
by the entity to the public in the country of ownership; (4) the public and 
the government of that foreign country generally perceive the entity to be 
performing a governmental function.113 
On the facts of Esquenazi, the court held that Tele Co was a government
entity because the Haitian government owned a majority interest of the 
company, provided the company with extensive tax advantages, appointed 
the Director General, and essentially gave Tele Co monopoly power over 
telecommunication services.114 Based on these facts, the Court of Appeals
for the Eleventh Circuit held that Tele Co was an instrumentality controlled 
by the Haitian government, and therefore employees of Haiti Tel Co were 
“foreign officials” under the FCPA, and so the defendants’ improper payments 
to Haiti Tel Co employees violated the FCPA.115 
108. Id. at 918. 
109. Id. at 917. 
110. Id. at 929.
111. Id. at 925. 
112. Id.
113. Id. at 926. 
114. Id. at 929. 
115. Id. at 932. 
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Although the court purported to define “instrumentality” with an eye
towards helping companies and regulators determine which SOEs fall
within the FCPA’s reach, it ultimately provided unwieldy guidelines that
lower courts were unlikely to refine. In Esquenazi, the court’s malleable, 
fact-intensive “instrumentality” test was too impracticable to provide real
guidance to the business community and FCPA regulators.116 
c. Doctors and Administrators in State-Owned Hospitals 
U.S. officials define “foreign official” broadly enough to include doctors 
employed by state-owned hospitals and who thus may fall under the definition 
of an SOE instrumentality.117 Doctors, nurses, administrators, and other 
employees at state-operated hospitals (considered instrumentality of the 
state), could qualify as foreign officials under the DOJ’s interpretation.118 
In recent years, the DOJ and the SEC have investigated many FCPA cases
that involved payments to doctors and hospital administrators in the state-
owned hospitals, such as AGA Medical,119 Diagnostic Products Corp.,120 
and Bristol-Myers Squibb.121 
2. State Personnel Under Chinese Criminal Law
a. Definition 
According to Article 93 of Chinese criminal law, the term “state personnel”
or state functionary means any of the following: a person who performs 
116. See United States v. Esquenazi: Eleventh Circuit Defines “Government Instrumentality” 
Under the FCPA, 128 HARV. L. REV. 1500 (2015), https://harvardlawreview.org/2015/03/
united-states-v-esquenazi/ [https://perma.cc/8Q5B-KDN7].
117. U.S authorities argue that “[b]ribes to public doctors can have a detrimental effect
on the public health care systems that potentially pay more for products procured through 
greed and corruption.” See SEC Charges Johnson & Johnson with Foreign Bribery, U.S. 
SEC. AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION (Apr. 7, 2011),  https://www.sec.gov/news/press/2011/
2011-87.htm [https://perma.cc/36QS-9S3D].
118. DPC (Tianjin) Ltd. Charged with Violating the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 
DEP’T OF JUST. (May 20, 2005), https://www.justice.gov/archive/opa/pr/2005/May/05_crm_ 
282.htm [https://perma.cc/TKY3-7BHM]. 
119. AGA Medical Corporation Agrees to Pay $2 Million Penalty and Enter Deferred
Prosecution Agreement for FCPA Violations, DEP’T OF JUST. (June 3, 2008), https://
www.justice.gov/archive/opa/pr/2008/June/08-crm-491.html [https://perma.cc/6N26-ZT6T]. 
120. In re Diagnostic Products Corp., Securities Exchange Act of 1934 Release No. 
51724 (May 20, 2005), http://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin /34-51724.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
2YET-XCAB]; DPC (TianJing) Ltd. Charged with Violating the Foreign Corrupt Practices
Act, DOJ Press Release (May 20, 2005), available at https://www.justice.gov/archive/opa/
pr/2005/May/05_crm_282.htm [https://perma.cc/97UN-73SA].
121. Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Charges Bristol-Myers Squibb 
With FCPA Violations (Oct. 5, 2015) (on file with author). 
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public duties at any state agency, i.e. legislative, administrative or judicial 
bodies or in the military; a person who is engaged in public service at a 
SOE, a people’s organization, or a state institution; an employee assigned
by a state agency, a SOE or an institution to a company, enterprise or
institution that is not owned by the state but carries out public service or 
any other person who performs public services in accordance with the law.122 
b. State Personnel and Non-State Personnel in SOEs
The FCPA and Chinese criminal law are consistently classifying people 
as government officials under Chinese criminal law, from officials and retired 
officials working for Chinese government branches to their close relatives 
or any other person who has a close relationship with these officials.123 
However, the FCPA and Chinese criminal law differ in how they define 
SOEs officials and executives.124 The FCPA broadly applies to corrupt payments
to both SOEs low-ranking employees and high-level officials.125 The Chinese
SPC, on the other hand, held that performing public duties 
refers to the duties of performing organization, leadership, supervision, and
management duties on behalf of state organs, state-owned companies, enterprises,
institutions, and people’s organizations. [Public] duties are mainly [manifested in] public
affairs linked to the authority and the [official] activities to supervise and manage state-
owned property. [For example] . . .  the staff of state organs perform their duties according 
to the law, [and] the directors, managers, supervisors of state-owned companies . . . 
manage and supervise state-owned property and other . . . [These activities correspond
to performing public services. And those activities of] labor services and technical
services . . . [in state-owned enterprises] are generally not considered [as activities of
performing public services].126 
Therefore, Chinese criminal law classifies personnel of SOEs into two 
categories based on whether they perform public services: the first category 
encompasses personnel engaged in public management functions, specifically
duties such as performing organization, leadership, supervision, and 
management,127 i.e., those personnel providing public services or performing 
122.  Chinese criminal law, art. 93. 
123. See supra note 49. 
124. Compare FCPA, with Chinese criminal law, art. 93.
125. FCPA Resource Guide, supra note 4, at 20. 
126. See Sup. People’s Ct., Minutes of the National Symposium on the Trial of 
Economic Crimes in Courts, (Nov. 13, 2003), http://www.law-lib.com/law/law_view.asp?
id=82074 [https://perma.cc/S4KT-DP3X].
127. Id.; see also SUN GUO XIANG, THE DOCTRINE AND SOLUTION OF BRIBERY CRIME, 
LAW PRESS OF CHINA 278−79 (2012). 
 89




















     
 
   
    
 
     
 
 
public functions in state-owned enterprises.128 The second category includes
business or technical personnel and laborers who are engaged in specific 
work in SOEs (the Chinese judiciary also tries bribery crimes in accordance 
with this principle).129 The Chinese SPC found that the first category of
employees usually consists of high-level officials who were state personnel 
and have committed the crime of accepting bribes, also known as public 
sector bribery.130 The Chinese SPC found that the second category usually 
consists of low-ranking employees who are not state personnel but who 
are also liable for the crime of accepting bribes when they accepted briberies 
from state personnel, and the offence is known as commercial bribery.131 
For example, in one influential anti-corruption case, a Chinese court sentenced
the former chairman of China Construction Bank to fifteen years in prison 
for accepting over $500,000 in bribes from the companies IBM and NCR.132 
The court found that Zhang who was a senior manager of a state-owned bank
accepted bribes and was sentenced to prison.133 
c. Doctors and Administrators in State-Owned Hospitals 
Most doctors in China work for state-owned hospitals, and state-owned
hospitals deliver medical services to the majority of the Chinese population;
the same anti-bribery principles apply to state-owned personnel as explained
in a 2008 opinion of the Supreme People’s Court (SPC) and of the Supreme 
People’s Procuratorate (SPP) : 
Where any State functionary in medical institutions, are involved in the
activities of purchasing medical products such as medicines, medical equipments, 
medical health materials, etc., and take advantage of his/her position to extort
money or property from the seller, or illegally accept the seller’s money or
property in return for benefits to the seller, which constitutes a crime, he or she
128. See CHEN HONG BING(陈洪兵), THE DILEMMA AND OUTLET OF JUDICIAL
DETERMINATION OF STATE PERSONNEL (国家工作人员”司法认定的困境与出路), 44 
Oriental Law .112(2015), https://sls.org.cn/moxing/orientalsTwo.html?id=8848 [https://perma.cc/ 
H4H2-KLXJ].
129. Minutes of the National Symposium on the Trial of Economic Crimes in Courts, 
supra note 127. 
130. See id. (finding that the people involved are usually those performing leadership,
supervision, and management duties). 
131. 最高人民法院、最高人民检察院关于办理商业贿赂刑事案件适用法律若
干问题的意见 [Opinions of the Supreme People’s Court and the Supreme People’s 
Procturatorate on Certain Issues Concerning the Application of Law in Handling Criminal 
Cases of Commercial Bribery] (promulgated by the Supreme People’s Court; Supreme 
People’s Procturatorate, Nov. 20, 2008, effective Nov. 20, 2008). 
132. David Barboza, IBM, NCR and Hitachi cited in bribery verdict, N.Y. TIMES,
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shall be convicted of accepting bribes in accordance with the provisions of Article 
385 of the Criminal Law and punished accordingly.
  Where any non-State functionary in medical institutions conducts any of the
acts of the preceding paragraph with the amount being relatively large, he or she 
shall be convicted of accepting bribes by non-State functionary in accordance 
with the provisions of Article 163 of the Criminal Law and punished accordingly.134 
Therefore, Article 163 punishes non-state officials, such as hospital staff 
members, for bribery if they demand free products from hospital suppliers 
by taking advantage of their position.135 Bribery also exists when medical 
personnel accept large amounts of products from the seller to the seller’s 
benefit.136 Article 385 similarly punishes state-officials such as hospital 
administrators.137 
d. GSK Case in China 
The GlaxoSmithKline’s (GSK) investigation and the subsequent conviction
for bribery is a leading case.138 Following allegations of widespread bribery 
in June 2013, GSK’s former China executive, Mark Reilly, hired investigator 
Peter Humphrey and his wife Yu Yingzeng to conduct an internal investigation 
that did not find any evidence of corruption or bribery.139 Chinese officials
began a separate investigation one month later and accused GSK’s senior 
executives of using travel agencies to offer kickbacks to government officials, 
hospitals, and doctors to sell more drugs at higher prices.140 Chinese authorities
accused GSK of paying $482 million in bribes to health officials and doctors 
to boost sales.141 In 2003, China’s Ministry of Public Security stated that




 138. Laurie Burkitt & Jeanne Whalen, China Targets Big Pharma; GlaxoSmithKline 
Hit With Bribery Allegations as Health-Care Sector Soars, WALL ST. J., July 16, 2013, 
(http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424127887323664204578607502156860618)
[https://perma.cc/2DZR-35HL].
139. Hester Plumridge, GlaxoSmithKline Found Guilty of Bribery in China U.K
Drug Maker Handed Largest Ever Corporate Fine in China, WALL ST. J., Sept. 19, 2014, 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/glaxosmithkline-found-guilty-of-bribery-in-china-411114817 
[https://perma.cc/44V7-A73B].
140. David Barboza, Glaxo Used Travel Firms for Bribery, China Says, N.Y. TIMES, 
July 16, 2013, at Section B.1. 
141. NYT Report: GSK ignored whistleblower who reported China fraud and bribery,
GAN Business Anti-Corruption Portal (Nov. 3, 2016), https://www.ganintegrity.com/
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GSK had used 700 travel agents to deliver the illegal payments since 
2007.142 After a secret one-day trial, the court imposed a fine of approximately 
$500 million on the company and sentenced five GSK company managers, 
including Reilly, to potential prison terms of up to four years for bribing 
nongovernmental officials, i.e. non-state personnel.143 GSK made a statement 
taking full responsibility for its actions, but it did not make a statement 
regarding bribing government personnel due to the sensitivity of the topic.144 
The Chinese government expelled Reilly, a British national, from China 
after his four-year suspended prison sentence.145 The court gave Reilly a
more lenient sentence because he voluntarily returned to China, assisted with 
the investigation, and confessed to bribery.146 
But the case did not end then: on September 30, 2016, GSK paid a $20 
million civil penalty to settle the charge that it violated the FCPA when 
China-based subsidiaries spent millions of dollars on pay-to-prescribe schemes 
for several years to pump up sales.147 The FCPA offenses spanned from
at least 2010 to 2013 and involved gifts, improper travel and entertainment 
with little to no educational purpose, shopping excursions, family and home 
visits, and cash.148 The costs associated with these payments were recorded 
in GSK’s books and records as legitimate expenses, for instance as medical 
association sponsorships, employee expenses, conferences, speaker fees, 
and marketing costs.149 The SEC’s order found that GSK violated the FCPA
books and records, and internal controls provisions.150 In a statement, GSK
said the DOJ “has also concluded its investigation into these matters and 
will be taking no further action.”151 
Because both Chinese and U.S. law enforcement agencies investigated
and punished GSK, this case provides a very valuable perspective to compare
the differences between the two jurisdictions’ laws and to analyze the different
recognition criteria of the demand-side and the different perceptions of 




143. Keith Bradsher & Chris Buckley, China Fines GlaxoSmithKline Nearly $500
Million in Bribery Case, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 19, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/
09/20/business/international/gsk-china-fines.html [https://perma.cc/3AGF-4RV9]. 
144. Plumridge, supra note139. 
145. Id. 
146. Id.
 147. Cassin, supra note 28. 
148. Id. 
 149. GlaxoSmithKline plc, Securities Exchange Act Release No. 79005, (Sept. 30, 
2016) (order instituting cease-and-desist). 
150. Id.
151. See Cassin, supra note 28.
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personnel or employees who are engaged in specific work in SOEs are
non-state personnel.152 Because doctors in state-owned hospitals only
provide medical services to patients and do not perform public duties, they 
are considered non-state personnel. Acceptance of bribes is mainly attributable 
to their personal actions and does not impair the public management functions 
of the government. Accordingly, when they are punished, they are punished 
for violating the crime of accepting bribes as non-state personnel. 
Conversely, hospital administrators are the executors of the government’s 
public health program, and their bribery acts undermine the public management 
functions of the government. However, the FCPA does not distinguish 
between the two types of personnel; they are defined simply as “foreign
officials.”153 Because state-owned hospitals are the main providers of 
public medical services in China and because of the nature of doctors’ work, 
the identification of doctors in Chinese criminal law is more consistent 
with the principle of proportionate punishment than it is in the FCPA. 
In the GSK case, the DOJ did not directly participate in the investigation.154 
Rather, the SEC found that GSK violated the FCPA’s accounting provisions.155 
Because of that, the company escaped criminal punishment for the same 
bribery that it was punished for under Chinese anti-bribery laws. 
In contrast, many similar cases investigated by the DOJ considered
doctors or administrators at state-operated hospitals to be “foreign officials”
under the FCPA.156 In some instances, the FCPA agencies used the same 
accounting provisions to prosecute cases that apparently began as bribery 
investigations; however, they were unable to satisfy the bribery provision’s 
jurisdictional requirements or found it was less than certain who had received 
the improper payment.157 Consequently, the DOJ’s aggressive interpretation
could significantly expand the number of persons who qualify as foreign 
officials and this ultimately would increase the compliance risk of MNCs 
doing business in China. 
Another problem that cannot be ignored is the lack of cooperation between
the two countries in anti-bribery cases. This lack of cooperation has inevitably
152. Opinions of the SPC and the SPP, supra note 131 (The term employees of a 
company or enterprise or any other entity as mentioned in Articles 163 and 164 of the Criminal 
Law shall include the non-state personnel in a state-owned company or enterprise or any 
other state-owned entity.). 
153. Supra note 122. 
154.  Exchange Act Release No. 79005, supra note 149.
155. Id.
156. See Burkitt & Whalen, supra note 138. 
157. Id.
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weakened the international community’s efforts to combat transnational 
bribery. Objectively speaking, this does not make for good policy. 
3. “Anything of Value” Under the FCPA 
a. Definition 
The FCPA only prohibits U.S. companies from bribing foreign officials 
with “anything of value” for the purpose of obtaining or retaining business 
but “anything of value” is not defined in the FCPA and, for this reason, 
liability could theoretically stem from the exchange of a single dollar.158 
In the DOJ’s non-prosecution agreements (NPAs) and deferred prosecution 
agreements (DPAs), the term “anything of value” has been broadly explained 
to include not only monetary payments, but also gifts, entertainment, meals, 
transportation, lodging, and a promise of future employment.159 In FCPA
cases involving China, paying for executive training programs at U.S. 
universities for Chinese foreign officials was found to be a potential FCPA 
violation when the programs did not specifically relate to the company’s 
products or business.160 Other possible examples of “anything of value”
could include payment for tuition for educational opportunities for Chinese 
officials or offering paid internships to their children;161 the SEC brought
charges for payments including sightseeing trips in the United States for 
Chinese officials who went to places such as Disneyworld, the Grand Canyon, 
and Las Vegas.162 Perhaps the broadest interpretation of “anything of value”
occurred in two cases that involved charitable donation and employment 
opportunities.163 
b. Enforcement Actions with Regards to Things of Value 
In the case against Nu Skin Enterprises, Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 
34-78884, 2016 WL 5044821 (Sept. 20, 2016) (Nu Skin), a Utah-based personal 
care company attempted to avoid sanctions from the Chinese Administration
158.  SEC v. Dow Chemical Co., No. 3-12567, at 4 (D.D.C. 2007) (The government 
pursued Dow Chemical where many of the individual payments amounted to less than $100 
each). 
159. United States v. Liebo, 923 F.2d 1308, 1311 (8th Cir. 1991) (regarding airline tickets). 
160. Complaint at 16–18, SEC v. UTStarcom, Inc., No. CV 09-6094 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 
31, 2009), https://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/2009/lr21357.htm [https://perma.cc/ 
3U98-5UR5].
161. E.g., infra note 167. 
162. See Complaint at 11, SEC v. Lucent Tech. Inc., No. 1:04-cv-01141 (D.D.C.
Dec. 21, 2007), http://www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/2007/comp20414.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
6LFV-7H2H]. 
163. See In re Nu Skin Enter., Exchange Act Release No. 34-78884, 2016 WL 5044821
at *2−3 (Sept. 20, 2016). 
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for Industry and Commerce (“AIC”) by seeking favors from a high-ranking 
Communist party official.164 Nu Skin allegedly made a significant monetary
contribution to a charitable organization controlled by that same official 
and assisted the official’s child in obtaining college letters of recommendation 
from an “influential U.S. person.”165 In exchange, Nu Skin asked the official
to persuade the AIC not to issue a fine, and as a result, AIC later dropped 
its investigation of Nu Skin.166 Nu Skin has agreed to pay $765,688 to
settle charges alleging that it violated the internal controls and books-and-
records provisions of the FCPA in connection with a charitable donation.167 
The SEC interpreted in the case against Schering-Plough Corporation that 
donations to a charity which provided a foreign official with an intangible 
benefit fell within the scope of “anything of value.”168 
In a 2015 case, the DOJ and the SEC opened a bribery investigation and 
looked into JP Morgan’s (JPMorgan) hiring practices in China where the 
bank allegedly offered employment to the Chinese officials’ and executives’
children in return for profitable investment-banking assignments that the
Chinese government officials could offer to the bank.169 Such recruitment 
and employment was allegedly linked to winning initial-public-offering 
mandates, a particularly lucrative investment banking activity.170 Under
the client referral hiring program, which allegedly ran from 2006 to 2013, 
JPMorgan took referrals from a broad spectrum of China’s business and 
political elite, including senior executives of major SOEs who then allegedly 
164. Id. 
165. Id.
166. See Michael J. Edney, Kevin J. Harnisch, Sun Hong, Wilson Ang, & Ilana Beth 
Sinkin, SEC fines Nu Skin US$765,688 to settle FCPA charges, NORTON ROSE FULBRIGHT:
PUBL’NS (Sept. 2016), http://www.nortonrosefulbright.com/knowledge/publications/142830/
sec-fines-nu-skin-us765688-to-settle-fcpa-charges [https://perma.cc/9DJZ-ALKC].
167. See SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, ADMIN. PROCEEDING FILE NO. 3-17556 (Sept. 20, 
2016), https://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/2016/34-78884-s.pdf [https://perma.cc/N572-
T7FU].
168. See In re Schering-Plough Corp., Exchange Release No. 34-49838, 2004 WL 1267922 
(June 9, 2004).
169. Jessica Silver-Greenberg, Ben Protess & David Barboza, Hiring in China by 
JPMorgan Under Scrutiny, N.Y. TIMES, (Aug. 18, 2013, 8:01 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.
com/2013/08/17/hiring-in-china-by-jpmorgan-under-scrutiny [https://perma.cc/SB4X-DJYD]. 
170. Emily Glazer, Michael Rothfeld, & Christopher Matthew, Two J.P. Morgan 
















     
  
 
    
 
      
 
 





awarded public offering assignments to the bank.171 The investigative focus
on JPMorgan’s hiring practices was catalyzed by reports of hires that 
supposedly helped JPMorgan win investment-banking deals with a state-
controlled financial firm, China Everbright Group, and with the state-
controlled China Railway Group.172 This included nearly 100 candidates 
referred by foreign government officials to more than twenty different 
Chinese SOEs.173 A number of the referral hires (222 were hired) resulted
in business for JPMorgan.174 The referring SOEs entered into transactions
totaling more than $100,000,000 in revenue for JPMorgan Asia-Pacific 
(APAC) or its affiliates during this period.175 The JPMorgan resolutions, 
at least insofar as they are presented in the Order and NPA, clearly relate 
to quid pro quo hires for near-term expected business.176 The SEC’s order
finds that JPMorgan violated the anti-bribery, books and records, and internal 
controls provisions of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.177 In 2016,
JPMorgan agreed to collectively pay the DOJ, the SEC, and the Federal 
Reserve $264.5 million and the DOJ went on to declare: “[a]warding prestigious 
employment opportunities to unqualified individuals in order to influence 
government officials is corruption, plain and simple. This case demonstrates 
the Criminal Division’s commitment to uncovering corruption no matter 
the form of the scheme.”178 
Although these cases involved books and records provisions’ violations, 
the implication of the DOJ’s and SEC’s position was that charitable donation 
and employment opportunities satisfied the giving of “anything of value” 
element under the anti-bribery provisions of the FCPA.179 The FCPA not
only forbids the giving of money or property, but also the giving of “anything 
of value,” a much broader term that encompasses indirect and intangible 
benefits.180  These legal developments suggest that enforcement agencies 
are continuing to expand the FCPA’s scope. 
171. Ned Levin, J.P. Morgan Hired Friends, Family of Leaders at 75% of Major Chinese 
Firms It Took Public in Hong Kong, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 30, 2015, 8:45 PM), http://www.
wsj.com/articles/j-p-morgan-hires-were-referred-by-china-ipo-clients-1448910715 [https://
perma.cc/ZD6V-NEB4]. 
172. Silver-Greenberg, supra note 169. 
173.  Credit Suisse AG., Exchange Act Release No. 83593 ¶ 3, 2018 WL 3302863 (July 
5, 2018)(order instituting cease-and-desist). 
174. Levin, supra note 171. 
175. Press Release, U.S. Sec. and Exch. Comm’n, JPMorgan Chase Paying $264 Million
to Settle FCPA Charges (Nov. 17, 2016) (on file with author), https://www.sec.gov/news/ 
pressrelease/2016-241.html [https://perma.cc/98JT-LWTV].
176. JPMorgan Order, Securities Exchange Act Release No. 79335, (Nov.17, 2016)
(on file with author), ¶¶ 23, 39, 43 (order instituting cease-and-desist). 
177. Id.
178. Id.
179.  See id.
180.  5 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(a) (1998). 
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4. Money or Property Under Chinese Criminal Law 
a. Definition 
Article 385 of Chinese criminal law prohibits the giving of “money and
thing (property)” to state personnel.181 A separate provision creates a duty
on a state personnel to identify the sources of his property.182 Article 395 
of Chinese criminal law provides that where the property or expenditure 
of any state personnel obviously exceeds his legitimate income, and 
the difference is huge, then the individual shall be ordered to explain the 
sources.183 If the individual fails to do so, the difference shall be determined
as illegal income. 184 
This provision is designed to create a duty for officials to account for 
levels of wealth that appear to exceed their lawful sources of income, and 
to deter Chinese state officials from flaunting their illegally acquired wealth.185 
The Supreme People’s Court (SPC) and the Supreme People’s Procuratorate 
(SPP) described this interpretation in the following opinion: 
The property shall include not only money and property in kind, but also property 
benefits, the value of which may be calculated in money, [including] provision of 
housing decoration, membership cards containing money, token cards (money) 
and travel expenses. The specific amounts shall depend on the actually paid costs and 
expenses. 186
Chinese authorities typically require that corrupt payments or benefits 
exceed RMB (renminbi) 30,000 ($4,286) in value in order to incur criminal
liability under Chinese laws, although authorities may bring enforcement
actions for payments or benefits that exceed RMB 10,000 ($1,429).187 
b. “Intangible Benefits” in China 
The above provisions of Chinese criminal law focus on giving “money
or property” or “property benefits” to government officials. In contrast, 
giving government officials intangible financial assets falls outside the 
181.  Chinese criminal law, art. 385. 
182. Id. art. 395. 
183. Id.
184. Id. 
185.  See id.
186.  Opinions of the SPC and the SPP, supra note 131, at 7.
187. The Supreme People’s Procuratorate of the People’s Republic of China’s
Interpretations, supra note 47. 
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scope of these laws and is therefore not prohibited.188 Chinese law is so
regulated for two reasons: first, criminal law norms should be clear and 
because the contents of intangible benefits are not certain, it is difficult to 
establish clear and specific criminal provisions; second, “money or property” 
can be easily accounted for.189 Consequently, establishing clearer and more
uniform penalties and operability is probably more feasible and it helps to 
maintain consistency in the scale of prosecution and judgment in the national 
judicial system.190 Furthermore, another social reason that cannot be ignored 
resides in the fact that many people in China would find that an official did 
nothing ethically or legally wrong by asking a domestic corporation or a 
MNC to provide an internship for a child or a relative. Although providing 
such internship is lawful under the Chinese laws, it might be unlawful under 
the FCPA if the MNC receives business in return.191 
China is a signatory of the United Nations Convention Against
Corruption (UNCAC).192 In accordance with Article 15 of the UNCAC, a 
state party shall establish a criminal offense for bribing public officials 
with “undue advantage,” which includes more than just “money or property” 
and extends to intangible benefits.193 Therefore, the Chinese “money or 
property” provision needs to be reformed to comply with the Convention, 
even if the current provision is the result of a choice based on realistic 
considerations. 
188. See generally Zhao Binghi ( 赵秉志), Zhong guo fan fu bai xingshi fa zhi de
ruoganzhong da xianshi wen tiyanjiu (中国反腐败刑事法治的若干重大现实问题研究)
(Research on Some Major Realistic Problems of China’s Anti-corruption Rule of Law). 
189.  See id. at 12.
190. See Gao Mingxuan & Zhang Hui, On the “Scope” of Crime of Bribery, L. SCI.
MAG.1, 3 (2013).
191. Supra notes 173, 174. 
192. Supra note 36. The UNCAC has 186 parties. It seeks to combat corruption by
encouraging cooperation between participating countries and maintaining the ideals of 
fairness, responsibility, and equality. The main goals of the Convention are prevention, 
criminalization, international cooperation, and asset recovery. 
193. G.A. Res. 58/4, United Nations Convention Against Corruption (Oct. 31, 2003), 
art. 15:
Each State Party shall adopt such legislative and other measures as may be 
necessary to establish as criminal offenses, when committed intentionally: (a) 
The promise, offering or giving, to a public official, directly or indirectly, of an 
undue advantage, for the official himself or herself or another person or entity, 
in order that the official act or refrain from acting in the exercise of his or her 
official duties; (b) The solicitation or acceptance by a public official, directly or 
indirectly, of an undue advantage, for the official himself or herself or another 
person or entity, in order that the official act or refrain from acting in the exercise 
of his or her official duties. 
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D. The Dilemma of MNCs that Operate Businesses in China 
Because of the differences between China’s anti-bribery laws and the
FCPA, FCPA compliance in China is a challenge for MNCs. Additionally,
a high number of individuals in China could be considered foreign officials, 
and thus MNCs can trigger FCPA liability by offering anything of value 
to these individuals, whether it be gifts, charitable donations, or employment 
opportunities.
As it currently stands, FCPA issues involving China present a particularly
thorny and elusive problem for MNCs. MNCs are caught between two extremes: 
a weak regulatory system in China that refuses to investigate these cases,
and a fine-based scheme in the United States that is so harsh that regulators 
will most likely never be able to give the maximum penalties. These two
systems are so different that they do not work together. Until they do,
companies will be faced with the uncertainty of not knowing whether making 
a payment will incur liability. 
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS
Everyone can agree that corruption is a major problem that has devastating 
financial and human costs. Corruption undermines the global economy,
threatens national security, and destroys livelihoods.194 The policy goal of
the FCPA—to encourage U.S. companies to forge business relations abroad 
on the basis of ethical business practices—is a worthy one. The method of 
enforcement, however, undermines that goal. The following section provides 
three concrete recommendations that would benefit all parties. 
A. Design Compliance Procedures to Meet Both 
U.S. and Chinese Requirements
U.S.’s anti-bribery rules have broad extra-territorial jurisdiction and
often affect MNCs operating in China.195 Recently, Chinese authorities
have also actively enforced domestic anti-bribery rules and these rules also 
extend China’s extra-territorial jurisdiction, which could also affect MNCs 
194. The World Bank estimates that about $1 trillion is paid every year in bribes. 
Lowering the Bar: How American Lawyers Told Us How to Funnel Suspect Funds into the 
United States, GLOBAL WITNESS (Feb. 1, 2016), https://www.globalwitness.org/en/reports/
loweringthebar [https://perma.cc/5R78-HFGM].
195.  See id.
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doing business outside of China.196 As a result, MNCs operating in China
face overlapping anti-bribery legal regimes that create new legal risks in 
other jurisdictions. 
The distinctions between the two regimes mean that a company’s compliance
procedures designed under one set of rules may not be sufficient to address 
the company’s risk of exposure under the other regime. This is particularly 
troublesome in the current enforcement environment, where white collar 
crime receives important government and media attention, and enforcement
agencies in each jurisdiction monitor bribery developments in the other 
jurisdiction and where an investigation in one jurisdiction often leads to
similar inquiries in the other jurisdiction.
Because law enforcement agencies in China and in the United States do 
not effectively cooperate on anti-bribery crimes, the best approach is to design 
compliance procedures that meet the requirements of both anti-corruption 
regimes. Western companies have experience meeting FCPA requirements, 
but MNCs must be aware of the problems unique to Chinese business culture.197 
It is conceivable that MNCs would have to pay huge compliance costs to 
achieve this goal. 
B. Clarify the FCPA’s Definition of “Foreign Official” and 
“Anything of Value” 
The main problem with the FCPA is that it has not clarified the definitions
of “foreign official” or “anything of value.” The cultural variations between 
the two countries’ business practices necessitate more comprehensive definitions. 
Given the dominant role of SOEs in many nations, especially in East
Asia, and the DOJ’s interpretations of the FCPA, some U.S. corporations 
worry that “everyone they deal with is a foreign official because they work 
for an SOE.”198 As such, the FCPA statute should be amended to indicate 
to what extent government control will qualify a corporation as an 
instrumentality. In China, the distinction between the central SOEs and 
local SOEs is of practical significance. U.S. companies are strictly prohibited 
from providing anything of value, even in trivial amounts, that could be 
construed as intended to gain a business advantage.199 This, however, does
not take into account business courtesy and anti-bribery laws in China or 
196. Id.
197. Such as risk assessment and analysis, regular training on internal anti-corruption
rules, improving the work of the compliance department, establishing regular report system and 
perfecting the due diligence, etc. 
198. See Declaration of Prof. Michael J. Koehler in Support of Defendants’ Motion 
to Dismiss Counts One through Ten of the Indictment at ¶ 447, United States v. Carson, 
No. SA CR 09-00077-JVS, WL 12854892, (C.D. Cal. Feb. 21, 2011). 
199.  See generally 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(a) (1998) (discussing the extent of the prohibition). 
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East Asia area.200 The FCPA should be amended to allow for the type of
gift-giving that is typical in many nations.201 The FCPA includes the “facilitating 
payments” exception in the Act.202 Excluding facilitating payments from
the scope of the FCPA makes common sense and is certainly culturally 
consistent with western hemisphere business practices in Latin cultures, 
such as Mexico.203 In fact, it certainly “displayed a cultural sensitivity to
business practices in the nation’s neighborhood with its close trading partners 
at the time.”204 Therefore, would it not be worthy to add another exception
under the FCPA for deals with business in some Asian countries? 
For these considerations, the FCPA should be amended to provide a 
clear definition of “foreign official,” of “instrumentality,” and of “anything
of value.” Whether broad or narrow, the FCPA boundaries should be 
clearly established. Predictability and fair notice are particularly valuable
to interpret a criminal statute that threatens individuals with incarceration 
for conduct that may constitute illegal corruption in some countries but 
standard business practice in others.205 
C. Continue to Improve Chinese Anti-Bribery Law Framework
1. Amendment of Anti-Bribery Provisions 
In order to effectively enforce conformity to domestic bribery standards,206 
China should amend its existing criminal law to cover more activities.
Because of the type of bribery often involved, China should gradually
incorporate various intangible benefits into criminal law and expand the 
scope of bribery crimes. Rather than concentrating on deterring public
officials from bribery, China can increase penalties to obtain an efficient
balance between both the demand-side and the supply-side of bribery.
Furthermore, these provisions should also conform to the requirements of 
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Michael S. Diamant & Jesenka Mrdjenovic, Don’t You Forget About Me: The 
Continuing Viability of the FCPA’s Facilitating Payments Exception, 73 OHIO ST. L.J.
FURTHERMORE 19, 21–22 (2012). 
203. See Michael P. Forrest & J.T. Norris, Bribery and China Go Together Like Yin
and Yang, 44 CUMB. L. REV. 423, 423 (2013). 
204.  See id. at 431. 
205. Steven R. Salbu, Extraterritorial Restriction of Bribery: A Premature Evocation of
the Normative Global Village, 24 YALE J. INT’L L. 223, 234 (1999). 
206.  Chinese criminal law, arts. 392, 393, 398. 
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the UNCAC.207To achieve long-term success, China must shift some of 
its focus to making widespread changes in its anti-bribery provisions. 
2. Publish Guidance Concerning the Anti-Corruption
Provisions in China 
In order to develop a truly successful anti-corruption regime, China
must increase transparency and implement strict enforcement mechanisms. 
Aware of the importance and necessity of independent investigative
agencies, China adopted an independent agency (the SSC) to enforce its
anti-corruption laws.208 Furthermore, the SSC should follow the DOJ’s
and the Serious Fraud Office’s steps and publish guidance concerning the 
anti-corruption provisions of criminal law and AUCL.209 Although SASAC 
has issued a compliance approach that applies only to central enterprises, 
its content is too abstract and too general, and there are no specific requirements 
for direct anti-bribery actions.210 Nonetheless, the guidance SASAC issued
fully explains its decision-making process and lists types of practices that 
are unacceptable; it also provides clear guidelines that will allow companies 
to implement suitable compliance programs and promote self-regulation.211 
This guidance will help maintain a balance between regulating both the 
supply and demand side of bribery and it will not only provide a valuable 
source of information for individuals and companies, but it will also help 
articulate and develop the anti-bribery provisions of Chinese criminal law.
3. Participate in International Cooperation with Foreign Countries
The OECD adopted the Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign
Public Officials in International Business Transactions (OECD Convention) 
in 1997.212 The convention obliges parties to criminalize foreign public
official bribery in international business transactions, outline criminal 
penalties for these violations, establish accounting provisions, and provide 
assistance to other signatories in investigations and proceedings against 
those charged with bribery.213 
207. UNCAC, supra note 36, art. 15 (providing each country should define bribery 
as “the promise, offering, or giving to a foreign public official . . . directly or indirectly). 
208.  Supervision Law, art. 3.
209.  See generally FCPA Resource Guide, supra note 4. 
210. SASAC, supra notes 91, 93. 
211. Id.
212. Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International 
Business Transactions, Organization for the Economic Cooperation and Development 
(Dec. 17, 1997), 37 I.L.M. 1. 
213. Id. arts. 1, 3, 8, & 9.
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If China can join the OECD Convention, it would benefit its current
anti-corruption work. The OECD Convention requires its members “to the 
fullest extent possible under its laws and relevant treaties and arrangements
[to] provide prompt and effective legal assistance to another Party.”214 
Furthermore, “cooperation with other signatories and forced peer reviews 
may encourage other countries to aid China in fighting corruption in international 
business transactions.”215 Hence, being a party to the convention will improve
governmental coordination between countries to continuously ensure that 
China will receive aid in combatting the supply side of corruption. 
Decades of international outreach and cooperation have played a crucial part
in the expansion of FCPA enforcement. Multijurisdictional collaboration brings
significant benefits to prosecutors and regulators combating international corruption . . .
Three primary factors have contributed to this collaborative impact: First, years
of relationship-building among international law enforcement is bearing more 
fruit . . . These long-cultivated relationships have facilitated recent investigations,
allowing them to run more smoothly and efficiently. Further, the U.S. participation in
multilateral for alike the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development’s 
Working Group on Bribery has significantly helped advance the anti-corruption
agenda across the globe, as well as multiplied and solidified the links among U.S. 
and foreign law enforcement, regulators and policymakers. . . . Second, cross-
border connections have improved information sharing . . .This sharing speeds up
the investigative process and helps countries develop stronger cases. . . . Third, more
and more foreign authorities have become actively involved in anti-corruption
enforcement.  In the last two years alone, the DOJ and the SEC worked closely 
with foreign law enforcement to achieve record-breaking settlements with multiple 
multinationals. These collaborative efforts bolster the U.S. agencies’ track record
of bringing bigger, harder-hitting cases alongside foreign authorities.216 
China has been the country with the largest number of FCPA cases in
recent years, but there is no cooperation between Chinese and American 
law enforcement agencies, and China has not brought charges against SOEs 
and personnel involved in FCPA cases.217 
214.  See id. art. 9. 
215. Emily Tran, Endemic Corruption in the People’s Republic of China, 17 SAN DIEGO 
INT’L L.J. 295, 326 (2016). 
216. Patrick Stokes & Zachariah Lloyd, 40 Years Of FCPA: Cross-Border Efforts and
Growing Risk, LAW360 (Dec. 2, 2017), https://www.gibsondunn.com/wp-content/uploads/ 
2017/12/Stokes-40-Years-Of-FCPA-Cross-Border-Efforts-And-Growing-Risk-Law360-
12-12-2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/8C5D-BDY4].
217. Pfizer re-opens the bribery of foreign companies, Wyeth is accused of bribery, SINA 
(Aug. 26, 2013, 4:18 PM), http://health.sina.com.cn/news/2013-08-26/1618101232.shtml 
[https://perma.cc/W3JV-WVK2].
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Thus, this feels like a shortcoming in international anti-bribery cooperation
and it should create an incentive for China to participate in international 
cooperation with other members of the UNCAC, as requires by the 1997 
Convention. In order to encourage countries to help China track down 
corrupt officials who have fled the country with illegal assets, China has 
adopted a policy, common in many countries, to share up to 80% of seized
assets from corrupt transactions.218 On October 26, 2018, China adopted 
the International Criminal Justice Assistance Law of China,219 which highlights
China’s efforts to strengthen international cooperation with other countries in 
the fields of investigation, prosecution, trial, and enforcement of criminal 
cases, especially those involving public sector bribery crimes.220 
As the international enforcement of corruption cases increases, China
cannot—and should not—be alone in fighting corruption. As a major economic 
player in world trade and investment, China has a responsibility to participate 
in the OECD Convention, to help other countries combat the spread of 
global corruption and to promote a fairer global economy. 
Due to longstanding historical, cultural, and political traditions, eradicating 
corruption in China will no doubt be a slow process. Adopting more effective
measures to do so will require changes in China’s cultural, political, and 
legal framework, but will yield numerous benefits for China in the long 
term.
218. Cheng Muyang, China to Share Assets from Fugitives Abroad with Other Countries, 
CHINADAILY.COM (Nov. 3, 2014, 11:22 AM), http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2014-
11/03/content_18856312.htm [https://perma.cc/4TT7-TTCH]. 
219. See Zhōnghuámínguóguójìxíngshìsīfǎxiézhùfǎ  (中华民国国际刑事司法协助法 )
[Law of the People’s Republic of China on International Criminal Justice Assistance] (promulgated 
by Standing Comm’n. Nat’l People’s Cong., Oct. 26, 2018, effective Oct. 26, 2018). 
220. See id. art. 2 (“For the purpose of this Law, international criminal justice assistance
refers to the assistance provided by the People’s Republic of China and a foreign country 
to each other in the activities such as investigation, detection, prosecution, adjudication 
and enforcement of criminal cases, including service of documents, arrangement for witnesses 
to give testimony or assist in investigation, sealing up, seizure and freezing of property 
involved in cases, confiscation and return of illegal gains and other property involved in 
cases, transfer for custody of sentenced persons and other assistance.”). 
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